198TASSA 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 ASSURED GUARANTY MUNICIPAL CORP. f/k/a Financial Security 4 Assurance, Inc., 5 Plaintiff, 6 11 CV 2375 (RPP) V. 7 FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB, et al., 8 Defendants. 9 New York, N.Y. 10 September 8, 2011 5:10 p.m. 11 Before: 12 HON. JED S. RAKOFF, 13 District Judge 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 SUSSMAN GODFREY LLP 16 Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: JACOB W. BUCHDAHL 17 THANE REHN 18 ARNOLD & PORTER LLP Attorneys for Defendants 19 BY: VERONICA E. RENDON DANIEL M. KUHN 20 21 22 23 24 25

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> MR. BUCHDAHL: For plaintiff, Assured Guaranty, Jacob Buchdahl and Thane Rehn from Susman Godfrey. Good afternoon.

> > THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. RENDON: And for the defendants, Veronica Rendon and my colleague, Daniel Kuhn.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

I assume both sides got the memorandum I issued earlier today.

MR. BUCHDAHL: We did, your Honor.

MS. RENDON: We did, your Honor.

THE COURT: So we're here on the motion in limine regarding the use of sampling. Let me throw out my initial thoughts. This is not a ruling at all, just where my head is at, so to speak, at the moment, but it will show you what you need to shoot at, so to speak.

I do think this is an appropriate case for the use of statistical sampling, but certainly I'm not prepared to sign off on it until I see the methodology that the expert uses. So I think it would be perfectly appropriate for the plaintiffs to go ahead and hire an expert and do some sampling, but in the end I may find that the methodology is flawed or that it's inadmissible for some other reason. So that's my initial thoughts.

Let me hear from defense counsel first and then I'll

hear from plaintiff's counsel.

MS. RENDON: Your Honor, I'll keep it relatively brief, because I think what you just touched on is exactly our primary issue with the motion that's being submitted at this point. In other words, it's premature and impossible to properly consider as a result of the failure for there to be a methodology that has been proposed at this point in time that can be meaningfully considered or ruled upon.

And basically at this point the motion in limine that is being made or that is being styled as a motion in limine is effectively reading like an opposition to a Daubert motion that we never filed because it would be impossible for to us have filed at this point because fact discovery hasn't even concluded, much less expert discovery, and expert reports haven't been submitted that we can meaningfully sink our teeth into.

THE COURT: So the sensible thing you're saying -- and plaintiffs may agree with this -- is, as with any expert, you take your chances, and if in the end I find that the methodology is flawed or there is some other problem, that will be too bad for their expert. But on the other hand, the most I'm prepared to say right now is that I don't see anything in the nature of this case that would inherently make it inappropriate for a statistical sampling, given the allegations in the complaint.

So as I pointed out the memorandum that you got today — the main reason you got it today is I'm very glad we had this conference because it forced me to get to work on your case. But as I read the complaint, there are many commonalities to the various mortgages and loans involved here. Of course, that may prove not to be the case, I don't know, I'm just going from the allegations. But assuming for the sake of argument that is the case, then statistical sampling would, in theory, be a perfectly appropriate way to proceed.

So let me hear from plaintiff's counsel if you have any concerns.

MR. BUCHDAHL: Your Honor, based on the text of the order that we read this morning and what you have said today, I think we have heard all that we need to hear. But to be clear, the defendant's opposition to the use of sampling was never based on methodology, or at least it wasn't primarily based on methodology, the defendant's opposition was based on the fact that sampling was unnecessary because this case would only be about 264 loans. I think your opinion that we read this morning makes it clear that is not the case.

Second, the defendants took the position, and have consistently, that there is something incompatible between the use of sampling and the repurchase remedy. And I think the opinion today also made clear that is not the case, because one could calculate a remedy or damages --

THE COURT: Well, you're right with a very important caveat, that my opinion is premised solely on the allegations in the complaint.

MR. BUCHDAHL: Absolutely. And your Honor, we understand we retain the burden to prove every element of our claims, and we intend to do so, but the reason we filed the motion that we did is because of some of the issues that had been brought up by the defendant.

THE COURT: As I said, it had a collateral positive effect anyway.

MR. BUCHDAHL: For purposes of our motion, we could do whatever the Court wants. If you want us to simply withdraw it --

THE COURT: I think the motion should be withdrawn as in effect moot at this stage, and we'll take it if and when you file an expert report. And if and when they move to strike your expert report or otherwise limit it, that will be the proper time, we'll have a Daubert hearing or whatever, and they, of course, at that point can say based on discovery it's not at all what the plaintiffs said in their complaint and it doesn't lend itself to a statistical sampling. That would really in effect be a logical objection as well.

So you could put whatever label you want on it, I'm just saying defense is not precluded from reraising that argument against a different factual record than we have before

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the Court right now. But why don't we just view the motion as withdrawn as moot without prejudice.

MS. RENDON: And your Honor, just to be clear -- and I think you just said that, but I want to be clear on the record that in what we have just heard on the record it would not be inconsistent for defendants to raise an objection at some later point in time when a motion in limine for a sampling or an objection to sampling is made that it is in fact inconsistent with other provisions in the contracts based upon what's developed during factual discovery.

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean the only thing I want to flag for you is, at least based on what is in the complaint, this looks to me like a case where statistical sampling would not a priori be precluded, but all I know is what's in the complaint. So you're not being ruled against in any way, shape or form.

MS. RENDON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very good. Thanks so much.